The Exxon Valdez: Drunken Sailor or Incompetent Stewards?
Contributed by Anthony Irsik
The two greatest disasters in Alaska’s history occurred in March, on Good Friday, the first being the Good Friday Earthquake of 1964, the second being the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in 1989. The earthquake was the first real test of Alaska as a state, and the oil spill was the final payment of the debt of carelessness produced by us. The latter will be the focus of this article.
1968: years before the tanker named Exxon Valdez ever entered Valdez’s waters. oil was discovered in Prudhoe Bay. The Oilmen of Texas and England rushed to find a way to tap into this resource and make use of it. The two biggest problems were how to get the machinery needed to drill for oil up to the North Slope, and how to get the oil to an ice-free port so that use and money could be made. A pipeline is needed. They decide on the final plan by October; Valdez will be the end point.
1973-77: TAPS is completed, and oil begins making its way down to Valdez. Its production had been hampered by a court order preventing its production, but the United States Congress eventually overturned the court order and prevented further litigation against TAPS production. The Congress vote was a close-run thing, after Alyeska gave many promises to use double hulled vessels, filter their ballast water, and be ready at all times to clean up the spill, the vote sat at 49 to 49, the Vice President was the deciding vote giving Alyeska the go ahead.
1989: In January two tankers leaked 1,700 barrels and 70 barrels of oil into Prince William Sound. Alyeska is able to clean up the 1,700 barrels, but due to some particularly bad weather they were unable to clean up the 70 barrels. Also, at this time there have been major questions and substantial accusations that Alyeska is not filtering their ballast water as promised, and pouring dirty, oily water into the pristine Sound. Further, the promise to use double hull tankers (which can almost prevent an oil spill themselves) is fully rejected for cheaper single hull tankers. Additionally, the Coast Guard reduced the quality of their radar due to budget cuts, such that they typically would only look out about 7 miles, and if they observed naval traffic any further, they would not have clear information.
Enter the Exxon Valdez. A single hull tanker with a damaged early warning system and an exhausted crew (Exxon did not allow for the federally required rest of crew before leaving port) is filled up with 1.3 million barrels of oil and leaves port March 23 around 9:30pm. The skipper, Joe Hazelwood contacts the Coast Guard asking if he can adjust course to avoid ice and he is given the go ahead (this is around 10:20). Hazelwood gives instructions to his crew for the next set of maneuvers before going to his quarters to do some unwanted paperwork. Not long afterward the Exxon Valdez leaves radar range of the Coast Guard, but everything continues smoothly, for a time. A little after midnight the pilot, Murphy (an employee of Alyeska), spots the lighthouse that warns of Bligh Reef, they are way off course, and he tries to make adjustments, but it is too late. The single hull of the Exxon Valdez is shredded, and oil begins spilling into Prince William Sound. Hazelwood rushes to the bridge, assess the situation, and reports to the Coast Guard before trying to free the tanker from the reef. He quickly realizes that the tanker is not going anywhere.
It has often been alleged that Captain Joe Hazelwood was drunk throughout this event. This claim is dubious. The only testimony I could find of one of his crew saying that he was drunk was that of the pilot Murphy who said that he “smelled alcohol on his breath”. Hazelwood was not tested for alcohol content until 10 hours after the event, so he allegedly had the chance to go drinking before to calm himself. Everyone on his crew (outside of Murphy) claimed that he was not drunk. The one mistake that he made for certain was leaving the bridge, of that even his fellow captains agreed, but all the other mistakes happened long before this Good Friday morning.
The error seems to be one of the leadership’s stewardships, not one captain. Certainly, if Hazelwood had been on the bridge he might have noticed something was wrong sooner, but the pilot was supposed to be the one familiar with the area. What is more apparent is that all the systems that are supposed to be there preventing human error were made inept by the love of money over the love of man and nature.